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ABSTRACT
The problem here is what to do with an N of 20? Comparative case studies effectively
deal with up to five or so observations. Aggregate statistical studies can easily with hundreds
and thousands of observations. But with an N of 20 is too large for detailed case com-
parisons and too small for the use of powerful statistical analyses. This article proposes a
middle ground that weaves an argument from a combination of multiple regression equa-
tions and case histories. Multivariate outliers identify cases for historical analyses; and the
exposure of data in bivariate scattergrams permits useful validity testing. The procedure is
illustrated with analyses of modern Asian population policy changes.
I. The Issue
NOT-SO-SMALL NUMBERS stand in an ambiguous position at the
intersection of a number of sociological approaches. We have little trouble
understanding a comparative study of two to six countries. (Tocqueville, 1863,
Bendix, 1956; Moore, 1966; Skocpol, 1979) Nor does a study of five families
(Lewis, 1959), 15 suicides (Douglas, 1967), a handful of inmates in a mental
hospital (Goffman, 1961) or a street corner gang (Whyte, 1943) seem un-
familiar or out of place. At the other extreme we are also in familiar territory as
we approach political behavior through voting studies of 1500 respondents or
reproductive behavior through surveys of 6,000.
Between these extremes, however, we meet a number of intractable prob-
lems. What do we do with an N of 20 or 40? With small numbers we can make
reasonable interpretations through our capacity to grasp a great deal of
historical or individual detail. For large numbers we can permit assumptions of
randomization to wash out much of the noise of detail and to make statistical
inferences either about system characteristics or variable relations. It is the not-
so-small numbers that give us trouble. With 20 to 40 observations we have too
many cases to permit our entry into the rich detail of the quality of behavior,
and too few for the use of our powerful, number-hungry new analytical
technology.
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II. Comparative and Statistical Methods
The problems of not-so-small numbers are found in both micro-level
&dquo;qualitative&dquo; research and in macro-level cross national research, but it is in
the latter that the problems may be said to be particularly acute today.
Theories of modernization made cross-national research highly fashionable
three decades ago, and the emergence of conflicting theories in Dependency
and World Systems perspectives have kept their popularity very much alive.
But the popularity of cross-national research derives from forces more mun-
dane and possibly more insidious than those expressed in theoretical
developments.
Much of the popularity derives, I believe, from the combination of three
salutary methodological developments. One is the rapid growth of data collec-
tion by national governments and international agencies. The resulting ar-
chives of &dquo;data&dquo; (or better, numbers) cry out for manipulation simply
because, like mountains, they are there. Second is the creation of an electronic
technology for manipulating numbers. Third is the parallel development of a
statistical technology that provides a logic for the electronic technology.
The convergence of these three developments makes it possible to spin out
theories about societal dynamics and to test their propositions with great ease.
Does urbanization-industrialization lead to a reduction of fertility, to produce
a massive social change in reproductive behavior? Do different political
systems lead to different rates of economic growth? Does political-economic
&dquo;dependency&dquo; retard economic growth and equality, to hold together a world
economic system in understandable and predictable ways? These are heady
questions, and the capacity to address them with answers to three decimal
points provides both delight and comfort, especially to academics whose
rewards in life come from publication.
The delight and comfort are hardly deserved, of course, regardless of the
material benefits that accrue. Cross-national statistical comparison presents a
wide array of beguiling problems. Ragin points out three of central impor-
tance. (1981) First is the question of the unit of analysis and observation.
Because nation states collect data, we typically use them as they are and
assume that we are dealing with societies, or with systems whose basic
parameters we understand. These assumptions are rarely critically examined
and are often simply ignored even if recognized. Second is the issue of validity.
We typically use indirect measures for highly complex patterns of behavior:
per capita gross domestic product for example, is used to indicate the wealth or
productivity of a society. Voting patterns, the existence of an opposition, or the
manner of selecting an executive, come to stand for some vaguely defined
quality of the political system. Foreign investment, trade or aid indicate
degrees of dependency, or a &dquo;nation’s&dquo; position in the international division of
labor. In the urge to generate numbers for our hungry analytical technology,
we seldom pause to question the validity of these indicators.2 2
The third problem Ragin identifies goes to the heart of the problem of not-
so-small numbers. The number of cases we have for cross-national analysis is
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small even in the best of circumstances. There are today only about 150 nation
states that can be used as units of observation, and for many of these, problems
of missing data abound.3 Further, the greater the theoretical specificity we
generate, or the longer the time span we use, the smaller is the number of cases
we usually have. We might start with 100 cases, but soon find ourselves deal-
ing with less than 50-too many for close comparative case analysis and too
few for effective statistical analysis.
Ragin’s solution to this problem is not of much help. In effect, he asserts
that we must distinguish between two methods. The comparative method is
limited to the logical examination of similarities and differences between whole
cases, necessarily limited to perhaps less than ten. It differs from the statistical
method, which &dquo;...requires the investigator to focus only on relationships be-
tween variables, ... and not on the differences and similarities between cases.&dquo;
(1981, p 113, emphasis added) Comparative and statistical methods are
qualitatively different and suited to different types of problems.
Let me propose an alternative solution that is both eclectic and modest. It
permits us to exploit both methods together, gaining the detail of the case
analysis and the power of the statistical method. Its rhetoric consists, first, in
weaving an argument with regression coefficients and the detail of case
histories, and second, in exposing the argument with a liberal use of bivariate
scattergrams. The former addresses the necessity of theory construction and
hypothesis testing. The latter addresses the issue of validity.
The steps are simple and not at all uncommon. First is the definition of a
problem. This both implies and requires the elaboration of a theoretical
framework that specifies the units of observation and analysis and provides a
general statement of dyanamic conditions, or variable relations in those units.
This is followed by the specification of variables and their operational defini-
tions. Indicators are obtained for the variables and the general model is tested.
In the process the cases are exposed in simple bivariate scattergrams, which
permit knowledgable observers of the individual cases to validate the in-
dicators. With even as few as 20 cases, the model can be tested with multiple
regression techniques. Following this, however, both influential and deviant
cases (or multivariate outliers) are identified for more specific historical com-
parative analysis. In Ragin’s terms, this approach uses the statistical method to
identify those cases whose comparative analysis will best illuminate or test the
dynamics proposed in the general model.
III. An Example: The Political Ecology of Modern Population
Change in Asia
Here an example is required to clothe the bare bones of the steps in this
process. I shall focus on the problem of rapid population growth in Asia during
the last half of the 20th century. I begin with the observation that modern Asia
is distinguished by the configuration of three conditions. The first is rapid
population growth. The second is the rapid spread of official antinatalist
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policies, and the third is the construction of public programs that are designed
to intervene directly into and to reduce marital fertility.4 4
The observation that these conditions constitute a distinct configuration
derives from a particular perspective, which is best identified as ecological in
nature. It thus derives from a theoretical framework that is marked by a
number of specifiable elements. The ecological perspective leads us to see the
phenomenon of population growth and fertility change as a pervasive adjust-
ment, a population adapting to a changing environment. Further, the perspec-
tive assumes that such adaptations always take place through some form of
organization and involve a specifiable technology. For theoretical reasons we
see political forms of organization as important, though not exclusive, forms
through which modern populations adapt to their environments.5 Like all
forms of organization, political organizations vary in their capacity to mobilize
populations and to direct the adaptive process in a concerted manner.
We must now return to comparative case histories to suggest a model of
the dynamics by which political organizations emerge, gain a specific
character, adopt specific policies and have a specific impact on the adaptive
process. The content of the model we propose derives originally from a com-
parison of Malaysia and the Philippines, and the historical processes by which
they adopted antinatalist policies, constructed the organizational instruments
of fertility-limitation, and thus actually had an impact on fertility. (Ness and
Ando, 1971) From demographic theory and observations of the distribution of
antinatalist policies, two other sets of conditions are included: the level of social
and economic development6, and the level of population density. 7
With these sets of conditions, or variables, the model proposes the follow-
ing process: Ecological pressure (population density) combines with the
strength of the political and administrative organizations to determine the tim-
ing of the antinatalist policy decision. The greater the density and the stronger
the political-administrative organizations, the earlier the state will make an an-
tinatalist policy decision.&dquo; Second, the earlier the antinatalist policy decision
and the higher the level of social and economic development, the stronger will
be the implementing organization, or the family planning program.9 Finally,
the stronger the family planning program and the higher the level of social and
economic development, the more rapid will be the rate of fertility decline.
With these specified variables and their operational definitions, we can ob-
tain quantitative measures for 21 of the major states of Asia. (Our study omit-
ted India and China, which were submitted to a comparative case analysis;
and Japan, which had completed the demographic transition by the time the
other Asian nations were entering it.) As the model is stated, it can be
estimated by three multiple regression equations. The dependent variables are,
respectively, the time of the antinatalist policy decision, the strength of the
family planning program, and the rate of fertility decline between 1965 and
1975. lo
These data can be arranged in a variety of ways to exhibit their relation-
ships, and thus to make statements about the similarities and differences of
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Asian states (to use the rhetoric of both comparative and statistical methods).
Exploratory Data Analysis (Tuckey 1980) provides a new and highly simplified
mechanism for both displaying and analysing distributions and relationships.
We choose here, however, to use the more familiar multiple regression and
path analytic techniques, largely because they are so widely used in cross na-
tional research. We believe, however, that most of the users of this technique
rely far too much on coefficients and far too little on qualitative, or com-
parative, historical detail. Thus we believe it is especially useful to develop a
strategy that exposes our measures to the careful scrutiny necessary for more
effective validation.
We expose the statistical estimations in three sets of scattergrams and path
diagrams (Figures 1-6). The scattergrams permit knowledgeable observers to
engage in at least crude validity checks on our measures.ll The first scat-
tergram (Figure 1) shows the scores of political-administrative system strength




on the horizontal axis, and the timing of the antinatalist decisions on the ver-
tical axis. The accompanying path diagram (Figure 2) shows the impact of the
two independent variables together on the timing of the antinatalist decision.
Each subsequent pair of figures follows this process. The scattergram presents
the immediate organizational score on the horizontal axis and the score of the
dependent variable on the vertical axis. Each scattergram is followed by a path
diagram that shows the full range of independent variables in relation to the
dependent variable.
Figure 2. Path Diagram of the Determinants of The Timing of the Antinatalist Policy Deci-
sion.
In these figures, the coefficients and standard errors (shown in paren-
theses) in the path models provide some support for the general theory.
Political and administrative conditions plus ecological pressures drive policy
decisions. Together with the level of social and economic development, the
policy decisions determine the strength of the family planning program; and
program strength together with the level of social and economic development
largely determine the rate of fertility decline.
The final step in our analytical strategy leads us back to a qualitative
assessment of individual cases, or back to comparative case histories. We iden-
tify the cases to be examined by the size of their residuals.l2 It is the deviant
cases, or the multivariate outliers that are most interesting.
In the first scattergram (Figure 1), North Korea and Pakistan are, respec-
tively, negative and positive outliers. In the case of North Korea the question is
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what led it to maintain a pronatalist policy despite its high levels of both
population density and political-administrative strength? Our explanation
draws on qualitative historical data and focuses on the hostile relations between
North and South Korea, and the fact that the South has twice the population of
the North. These political and demographic conditions can adequately explain
why and how North Korea has retained a pronatalist policy.
Pakistan is the other deviant, with a much earlier policy decision than
predicted by its relatively low level of population density and its weak political-
administrative system. Pakistan’s history shows clearly, however, that when it
made its antinatalist policy decision, it had just experienced a surge of what we
call political-administrative system strength. Ayub Khan had just come to
power with new policies to strengthen the center. The country also moved for-
ward rapidly in centralized national economic planning, and it was precisely
the planning activity, combined with a new knowledge of the size and growth
rate of the population (a monitoring of ecologically relevant conditions) that led
to the policy decision. All of this is quite clear from a reading of the political,
organizational and economic history of the period.
The ‘ ‘strength&dquo; of the administrative system did not last out the decade of
the 1960s, of course, giving it an overall low score, but the early decision re-
mained as a part of policy. It was not effectively implemented, and has not yet
been to this day, but the time of the policy decision stands. This not only
clarifies the dynamic relationship, it also amounts to a qualification, or partial
invalidation, of the indicator of policy decision. Our measure was the time of
the decision, which, as we see here, is not by any means a fully valid measure
of the strength of the policy decision.
The scattergram (Figure 1) shows Mongolia as a significant negative
outlier, but with its exceptionally low population density, it performs according
to expectations in the multiple regression equation. It can also be readily
demonstrated that Mongolia’s political elite perceive its small and scattered
population as an obstacle to economic development. Thus, its population
policy is deliberately pronatalist. It is, in effect, designed to promote national
economic development, just as is the antinatalist population policy of South
Korea, India, or Indonesia.
Let me pass over the deviant case analysis of the second step (Figures 3
and 4) and go to the final one (Figures 5 and 6) where the rate of fertility
decline is explained. Here the major deviant case, in both the scattergram and
the equation, is Iran, with virtually no decline in fertility, despite its alleged
strong family planning program, its early policy decision and its apparent high
level of social and economic development. To understand Iran’s failure in fer-
tility reduction we can engage in a number of comparisons. In any exercise, we
find that Iran failed to produce a human service system in general and a family
planning program in particular that was capable of moving resources to the
poor rural population. It was a system in which attention, interest and
resources were concentrated at the top. Iran’s wealth lay in oil, discovered, ex-
ploited, paid for and consumed by other societies. Its great wealth thus did not
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Figure 3. Scattergram of Years of Antinatalist Policy and Family Planning Program Strength.
Figure 4. Path Diagram of the Determinants of Family Planning Program Strength.
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Figure 5. Scattergram of Family Planning Program Strength and Rate of Fertility Decline
1965-75.
Figure 6. Path Diagram of the Determinants of the Rate of Fertility Decline 1965-75.
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imply an effective mobilization of its own human resources, as was true, for ex-
ample, in South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Singapore or Sri Lanka. Its family
planning program did not, as was very true in much poorer Indonesia, move
out of the urban centers to the villages and to the rural poor. In fact, in explain-
ing the failure of Iran’s fertility-limitation program, the content of the discus-
sion sounds similar to the one used to explain the fall of the Shah.
There are many similar examples of the combination of statistical and
comparative analyses that can be generated in this exercise, but space
precludes their exposition here. One central issue must be mentioned, even if
only in passing. To this point our theoretical framework has permitted us to
work with nation states as the units of both observation and analysis. This is
justified by our specification of the political organizations of the state as at least
some of the major organizational forms through with the adaptive processes are
working. It is not necessary to stop with this unit of analysis, however, and ex-
tended theoretical development would lead us to examine the states in the
larger setting of a world community or a world economic system. We can move
to this level of analysis and ask to what extent the external world intruded into
these state decisions and programmatic implementations.
The same strategic process can be used. We can develop a theoretical
statement that specifies the condition of the larger setting and the mechanisms
by which it affects state level actions. In this case, we found these in the
technical and organizational operations of the United Nations regional
organizations, and of other international agencies that promoted the organiza-
tion, technology, and ideology of national economic planning. This analysis
employs largely a narrative historical form, with a focus on organizations that
span national boundaries. We can also quantify certain elements of this boun-
dary spanning by noting the per capita level of foreign assistance received by
each state for its modern fertility-limiting activities. The resulting measures
can be entered into the same three series of regression equations used for the
states alone, both to test the general theory and to specify those cases that
should be subjected to individual comparisons. We do not show the data and
findings, since the technical details require more space than is warranted by
what is, after all, merely an illustration.
Our interpretation from these analyses, however, is that in Asia, the pro-
cesses of policy decision and program implementation came more from within
than from without the states. There was, to be sure, external influence from
both the emerging Asian community and from the western nations. All of this,
however, constituted an important interactive process that supported, but
could not counter, processes whose political and social roots lay within the
states. The exposition of this argument is woven out of historical treatment of
international organizations, and specific foreign assistance programs, regres-
sion coefficients of the impact of foreign assistance on national population plan-
ning programs, and individual country analyses that examine the deter-
minants of both effective and ineffective foreign assistance programs.
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Space precludes a full exposition of this story, but this should at least make
clear the steps in the strategy that permit us to weave together comparative and
statistical methods of analysis. Most cross-national analysis focuses exclusively
on one method or the other. The systematic comparative illustration of a few
cases provides rich detail but is weak in the generation of more general prin-
ciples of social change. Statistical crossnational studies seldom permit the
reader to check the validity of the indirect measures that are used to indicate
highly complex behavior patterns, nor do they provide the historical detail by
which we can gain a better understanding of the complex processes of social
change. The rhetoric of statistical cross-national analyses is typically the
rhetoric of numbers and equations, often lacking even the most cursory men-
tion of the fact that what we are attempting to understand is collective human
behavior rather than simply the relationships between numbers.
It is not necessary, however, to make the severe choice between these two
strategies. Cross-national studies can exploit both comparative and statistical
methods, and we would argue that it is imperative that they do so. Our in-
dicators are far too indirect, and their validity far too suspect to permit the ex-
tensive statistical treatment we often see in studies of larger numbers of cases.
And our need to understand the general processes by which many different
states or societies move and change with and against one another is too great to
permit us to be content with comparisons of very small numbers alone. It is in
the not-so-small numbers that we can find both the rigor of statistical analyses
and the rich detail of individual cases.
NOTES
1 Naming this class of numbers presents an interesting challenge. We thought of calling them
RANs, for Reproductive Age Numbers, or MANs, for Middle-Aged Numbers. They could
also, of course be called Not-So-Large Numbers, but a creative lapse has forced us to rely
on this somewhat more prosaic term.
2 I shall not attempt to deal here with the equally intractable problem of reliability. Few peo-
ple read Oskar Morgenstern (1950) any longer, but his criticism of both the reliability and
validity of economic measurements are still well worth reading, as is his argument against
their frequent uncritical use.
3 The problems are compounded as missing data also suggest less than certain validity for
those data that are available.
4 Elsewhere, I apply these observations to the whole of the currently high fertility world,
which is also almost coterminous with the Third World. (Ness 1983) The focus on Asia is
based on a further observation that this configuration emerges and is most fully developed
in Asia, and this for understandable historical reasons whose exposition is precluded here
due to limitations of space. (Ness and Ando 1984 provide the full explanation.) The first
condition has occurred before in other parts of the world, but not with as great power as we
find today in the Third World. The second and third conditions are quite unique today.
Most governments throughout most of human history have been pronatalist. Thus the rise
of official antinatalism today represents a significant revolutionary condition. Finally,
throughout most of human history, the marital bond has typically carried with it both the
right and the obligation to reproduce. Today the public intervention to reduce marital fertility
constitutes another revolutionary condition.
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5 The theoretical base of this observation lies in the Weberian perspective on the
bureaucratization of the world. (Weber 1968, Coleman 1972, and Jacoby 1968)
6 Many measures are available for the level of social and economic development, and most
are highly intercorrelated. We used a combination of Infant Mortality Rates, GDP per
capita, and female school enrollment. This may be said to indicate the extent to which a
society is healthy, wealthy, and wise.
7 We have observed that states with antinatalist policies in 1973 had higher average levels of
population density than those that had not made such decisions. This was true for the Third
World as a whole, and for each of the four major regions within the Third World: Africa,
Asia, Latin America, and the Near East-North Africa. This observation is intuitively accep-
table in an ecological perspective and leads to the use of population density as a general and
indirect measure of ecological pressure. See also Galle (1978) for a more general theoretical
and empirical treatment of the relation between population density and a population’s
adaptive processes.
8 For the strength of the political and administrative organizations we coded three dimen-
sions, whose contents were derived from the Malaysia-Philippines comparison. These were
the strength of the political center, the commitment to modern national economic planning,
and the capacity to monitor social and economic change. To code individual states, we used
a narrative five point scale with multiple coders, whose results showed high intercoder
reliability. (Ness and Ando, 1984)
9 The measure of family planning program strength was developed by Lapham and Mauldin
(1972) and updated by Freedman and Berelson (1976), and Mauldin and Berelson (1978).
It codes and scores a variety of organizational and resource conditions that are typically
found in varying degree in modern family planning programs.
10 The problem of the validty of the measures is a serious one and we cannot claim to have
solved it to full satisfaction. There is still considerable uncertainty about the actual rate of
fertility decline, for example. (Cavanaugh, 1981) At this time, we can only move on to our
exposition of the cases by bivariate scattergrams to permit knowledgeable others to make in-
dependent judgements.
11 We argue that this should be standard practice in cross national analysis. We are seldom
shown specific countries in their critical relationships, and often we are neither told which
countries are included or excluded in specific equations, nor what the individual scores are
for the countries included.
12 We have usually considered outliers to be those cases whose standardized residuals are + or
&mdash; 2 greater than the mean of the residuals. In some cases the residual of the outlier is less
than 2, but the case remains quite alone above or below others.
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